Thomas Jefferson once wrote that “to compel a man to furnish
contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is
sinful and tyrannical.” A similar
principle is rooted in the First Amendment, which generally prohibits the
government from forcing people to pay for speech with which they disagree.
Federal law nevertheless permits states to impose “agency
shop” arrangements under which every employee in a unionized workplace, even
though not a union member, must pay to the union, as a condition of employment,
a compulsory service charge equal in amount to union dues.
The Supreme Court rejected non-union employees’ challenges
to such coerced charges on freedom of association grounds in Railway Employees
v. Hanson (1956). But it softened that
harsh result by ruling in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), that such
compelled charges cannot be used over an employee’s objection for political
causes he opposes, citing the First Amendment freedom from compelled speech.
Now the Washington State Supreme Court has turned upside
down the latter ruling protecting First Amendment rights. In Washington v. Washington Education
Association, it declared unconstitutional a Washington State law that barred public
employee unions from spending a teacher’s service charges on political causes,
absent affirmative consent from the teacher. The court ruled that forcing the union to get affirmative consent for
such political spending, rather than putting the burden on the teacher to
formally make an affirmative objection, burdened the union’s own First
Amendment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal of that
ruling, and will hear arguments that it be reversed on January 10.
There is something very peculiar about the Washington Supreme
Court’s holding that the First Amendment creates not just a floor, but a
ceiling, on the First Amendment rights of public employees over the use of
their compelled union dues.
In essence, the state supreme court seems to have believed
that everything not mandatory under U.S. Supreme Court precedent must be
forbidden.
But the U.S. Supreme Court has never said that states cannot
give dissenting employees additional safeguards against political use of their
coerced dues, such as requiring affirmative consent. Nor has it ever suggested that public
employee unions are entitled to have the state give them the maximum amount of
union dues they are not forbidden to collect under U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that states are
free to ban “agency shop” arrangements altogether, as many “right to work”
states have done, in protecting non-union employees from having to pay any dues
to the union in their workplace. And the
federal appeals courts have consistently upheld paycheck protection statutes
like Washington’s, which protect a non-union employee from political use of her
coerced dues absent her affirmative permission.
The fact that the First Amendment itself does not give non-union
employees a blanket right to withhold compelled dues absent an affirmative
objection to their use for political causes does not mean that state law cannot
give the employees additional protections.
It is well established that a state law can give citizens
broader free speech rights than federal law gives them, and states frequently
do just that.
For example, under the Washington State Constitution, content-neutral
restrictions on speech are subject to tougher scrutiny than under the federal
First Amendment.
Under California state law, students have free speech rights
in what they say in a school-sponsored newspaper, even the federal First
Amendment confers no such rights, under the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood decision.
Similarly, under the Massachusetts courts’ Pyle v. South
Hadley decision, students have a state constitutional right to use offensive language
to express a political point of view, although such language lacks federal
First Amendment protection.
A state is thus free to expand the rights of its citizens,
such as students or teachers, even when doing so reduces the power of
government officials or the state-conferred privileges of public employee
unions.
--Hans Bader